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BOOK REVIEW
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA. By
Jerold S. Auerbach.' New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. Pp. xiii,
359. $13.95.
Reviewed by David A. Dittfurth2
In Unequal Justice Jerold S. Auerbach attempts to prove that the legal
profession has failed to adequately pursue what is ostensibly a central goal
of our legal system - equality of justice. He finds little evidence that the
legal profession or its dominant factions have made an adequate effort to
assure the provision of legal services according to need. On the contrary,
most of the historical evidence presented in this book leads one to believe
that the legal profession has accepted profit as its real goal.
The author details the growth of large law firms, which developed to
serve the legal needs of large corporations and wealthy individuals. Be-
cause of their organization, wealth, and the advantages provided by this
wealth, these firms were able to achieve the status of an elite within the
profession by promoting the notion, already accepted with regard to busi-
nessmen, that the worth of a lawyer was to be determined by his level of
income. Law schools, anxious to point to their well-employed and "elite"
graduates, reacted by adjusting legal education to focus primarily on the
legal problems encountered by the monied segment of society. In assuming
elite status the large law firms also took control of the American Bar
Association and, as spokesmen for the profession and through their influ-
ence over legal education, were able to institutionalize their rationaliza-
tions for choosing wealthy, rather than needy, clients. Equality was pre-
sumably satisfied because everyone had the ability to be heard in court,
and justice was satisfied if established procedures were followed in the
litigation. In this way, the author reasons, the function of the adversary
process was distorted so that lawyers came to view it as a mechanism
that assured equality of justice.
If these were the prevailing attitudes, then lawyers could avoid dealing
with the moral or social implications of their choice of clients. One simply
assumed that institutional processes maintain justice, and this assumption
removed all considerations but profit from the determination of career
1. Professor of History, Wellesley College.
2. Associate Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law, B.A., 1965, J.D., 1967,
LL.M., 1973, University of Texas.
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choices. Acceptance of this rationalization process, as Mr. Auerbach sees
it, caused lawyers to become the "hired guns" of popular folklore, serving
anyone who is willing to pay their price.
Notwithstanding these rather unsavory observations, the author recog-
nizes that the legal profession is essentially a reflection of the society of
which it is a part. He contends, however, that the legal profession cannot
rest on this fact since it is responsible for formulating and applying law in
a very legalistic society. Because of this important societal function, the
legal profession must stand ready to resist periodic popular movements,
such as "McCarthyism," that are bent upon depriving "unpopular" citi-
zens of their legal rights. Lawyers must also be ready to work for the
realization of constitutional principles when society is ignoring or refusing
to act upon existing deprivations, such as the civil rights movement of the
sixties. The historical episodes in Unequal Justice are presented to empha-
size the failure of the legal profession to fulfill these responsibilities in the
twentieth century.
In the latter part of the book Mr. Auerbach focuses on those legal schol-
ars who criticized the activism of the United States Supreme Court under
Chief Justice Earl Warren. These scholars were concerned that rapid
change in law effected by the Supreme Court might undermine the respect
for its decisions and perhaps disturb the balance of powers between the
branches of the federal government. In essence Mr. Auerbach sees their
arguments as little more than theoretical rationalizations for the contrived
legalisms which kept minorities and minority viewpoints from a fair hear-
ing. He insists upon correction of law so as to rapidly provide justice for
minority groups. Mr. Auerbach assumes that his liberal view of justice is
the only valid one and that the main hindrance to its immediate realiza-
tion in law is the legalistic emphasis on "neutral" standards which masks
a conservative preference for the status quo. This assumption causes a
serious weakness of the book, for Mr. Auerbach fails to recognize at least
two legitimate problems impeding legal change.'
First, few would argue that, as a general proposition, minorities should
not receive justice; however, courts do not enjoy the luxury of simply
deciding in favor of the "good guys" and against the "bad guys." Even
Justice William 0. Douglas, a forceful liberal activist while on the Su-
preme Court, observed that "the eternal problem of the law is one of
making accomodations between conflicting interests."4 Restrictions upon
the power of the federal judiciary arising from the demands of separation
of powers confine the federal judiciary to the determination of conflicts
3. Although he has not made any distinction between the different law makers, his
contentions relate primarily to the making or changing of law by federal courts, especially
the United States Supreme Court.
4. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948).
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between litigants who assert personalized, mundane interests.' If broad
policy issues are implicated, they are decided in light of, and indirectly
through, these more ordinary human conflicts. Also, a litigant who carries
his contest all the way to the Supreme Court will rarely have the audacity
to arrive without a valid general principle supporting the justness of his
cause. The Court, therefore, does not choose in favor of principle but must
choose between principles, each of which would legitimately serve as a
definition of justice in the abstract. In seeking justice, the Court is com-
pelled to accomodate these principles primarily because of the ideal of
providing justice for everyone. "Justice" cannot be provided to society at
large by choosing a favored group; but if there is a bias, it should at least
be toward the majority's perception of justice. If a change in the law is
involved in a Supreme Court decision, it will tend to represent incremental
rather than fundamental change and a shift in priority as to principles
rather than the choice of one and the total disavowal of the other.,
Secondly, the emphasis on "neutral" standards relates primarily to the
requirement that courts justify their decisions through the reasoned use of
judicially accepted rules of law. By compelling a judge to use these estab-
lished precepts, in his justification if not in his decision making, society is
assured some minimum lev'el of stability and predictability of law, as well
as some minimum protection from judicial arbitrariness. Such control is
necessary since federal judges are not subject to direct control by the
electorate.7
It is true that courts, especially the Supreme Court, do often change law
with the policy consequences in mind. To an extent this is acceptable since
legal precedents are always susceptible of differing interpretations and a
change of conditions may have clearly robbed a precedent of its legal
justification.' The problem with expecting a court to effect fundamental
change is that the obligatory reliance upon precedent, and the accepted
use of it, tends also to circumscribe legally acceptable reasoning. To the
extent an interest has not previously been considered by courts, the asser-
tion of that interest in court will be without "reasoned" justification and
judges will tend to view that interest as untenable or even absurd. This
5. This is a reference to the requirement that a litigant have "standing to sue" before
federal courts may exercise judicial power over the case.
6. As an example, the Supreme Court, through a rather ingenious system, accommo-
dated the interest of a pregnant female in choosing to have a physician-performed abortion
and the interest of a state in protecting maternal and fetal life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
7. Federal judges are appointed for life and their compensation may not be diminished
during their continuance in office. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
8. This flexibility arises from the case by case method of judicial decision making. Even
though rules established in prior cases are to be used, these rules must constantly be reexam-
ined and reinterpreted in light of new cases which are not ordinarily brought to trial and




reaction, however, is not unique to the law. What, for instance, would have
been the reaction of the majority of people during the Second World War
to a decision by the Supreme Court that men could not constitutionally
be drafted into the army unless women were also drafted? Prior to the
women's movement and the extensive social consideration of equality of
rights and obligations between the sexes, this announcement would have
been greeted not only by disagreement but by shock at its "absurdity"; and
more importantly, the decision may well have been ignored.' An examina-
tion of this problem with new viewpoints might have led the author to
provide better advice for those who are interested in changing law. Since
judges, like people in general, operate primarily on the basis of common
experience and awareness, they must be made aware of new issues and new
reasoning that arises outside of their experience. For instance, few judges
are nonwhite or female, and therefore they tend to have less experience
with and sympathy for the special needs and concerns of these groups.
Social action movements have in recent times provided the needed aware-
ness of the difficulties of racial groups, women, and even the environment.
As these new viewpoints became understood and more acceptable, both
social and legal change resulted. It must be stressed that this is a process
of acceptance and change, and the courts can only be a part of the process.
Mr. Auerbach would have judges making direct value choices without
resort to legalisms, but in assuming that justice can be interpreted only in
his way he does not consider that most judges might be conservative and
that their unfettered value choices would be unacceptable to him. A per-
manent change of perspective by the judiciary as to any group will occur
only when members of that group are placed by political appointment on
the bench. He is correct in insisting that for equal justice persons without
funds must be provided representation and that members of minorities
must be allowed into the profession. He is wrong, however, to the extent
he argues that the law must relax its adherence to the pursuit of neutral
standards. Neutrality in decision making is an ideal, not a status, and-
encompasses a pursuit of a broader perspective and understanding of the
just accomodation of conflicting interests. The standards are constantly
modified and changed reflecting this pursuit. Since little in the law is
completely black or white, there can be divergence from this orderly pro-
cess in exceptional circumstances, but the exception does not invalidate
9. The Constitution confers upon the popularly elected members of Congress the power
to directly make broad policy decisions by enacting legislation. Congress also possesses the
taxing and spending power necessary to implement its decisions. The federal judiciary oper-
ates without taxing or direct enforcement powers (held by the executive) and so must depend
to a greater extent upon respect for its decisions by the other branches so that they will
cooperate in implementing or abiding by those decisions. Herein lies the reason that the
Surpeme Court is hesitant to directly make broad policy decisions - such action is likely to
be viewed by Congress as usurpation of its powers.
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the rule-it only shows that the rule is a product of imperfect human
beings. Whatever may be the imperfections in the adherence to neutral
standards, this obligation stands as the only force in law, independent of
popular opinion, toward clarification and realization of equal justice
through the courts.
